Aristotle s Theory Of Morality - 1673 Words

As Aristotle emphasizes, the field of ethics is concerned with the well-being of the city as a whole, not as much with individual well-being (NE I.2, 1094b). On an individual basis, the distinct human function has no significant moral role. However, when practicality is stressed over theory, the moral significance of that distinct function becomes more integral. Aristotle’s account of the highest good in Book I of Nichomachean Ethics concerns the the general desire for happiness: it serves as a guide for a political leader, not a layout for individual morality. Thus, the distinct human capacity is morally significant insofar as it acts though politics. Although it is true that the method he uses to arrive at his conclusion seems to†¦show more content†¦2. To perform the human function well is to use the distinct capacity well—the difference between an ordinary human and a good human lies in his ability to reason well. 3. The function of a good human is to use the distinct capacity well. 4. The good for humans is to perform the human capacity excellently—that is: activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. 5. The good for a human is to use the distinctive capacity excellently, in accordance with virtue. The first part of the argument is as such: Life is not specific to man. Plants and animals also live and grow. Perception is also not unique to man, since animals can perceive. Man’s function lies in his relationship to rationality, in being obedient to it and in exercising it. This ability to reason is man’s distinct capacity: that which sets him part from all other species. There doesn’t seem to be anything morally significant about this premise. For the most part, one can agree that what sets humans apart from other species is this distinct ability. Others have argued that only man can do things like tell jokes, wage war, or recite poetry, but I think Aristotle could convincingly argue that all of these actions are guided (or misguided) by our capacity to reason. The prominent objection here seems to be that what is natural might not necessarily be what is â€Å"good†. The function argument serves to highlight man’s distinctiveness from other species. Again, it is not